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INCOME TAX DEDUCTIONS
INCOME TAX DEDUCTIONS AS A MEANS OF
EFFECTUATING GOVERNMENTAL POLICIES
ROBERT H. GRAY*
As a means of social control, income tax deductions obviously repre-
sent but a small segment of a much larger problem which permeates not
only the entire field of taxation, but also the entire field of law, of
politics, and of economics as well. The regulation of individual con-
duct has been a necessary by-product of all organized society. The
planning and supervision of activity and the adjustment of differences
have always been important parts of community life. Compliance has
been secured by the use of self-restraint, coercion and hope for reward;
the extent and the complexity of the machinery required for this pur-
pose has varied with the economic and political development of the
state and with the objectives desired and the means used to obtain
them.
Contemporary industrial civilization, with its division of labor, its
intricate financial system, and its large-scale production and distribu-
tion of goods, has demanded careful planning and coordination. Al-
though opinions differ as to the proper place which government should
occupy in this vast organization, few fail to appreciate the growing im-
portance of political regulation and control. The Laissez-faire philos-
ophy of the nineteenth century is being rapidly replaced by a less in-
dividualistic attitude. Administrative tribunals and state ownership
and operation of property reflect this fundamental change. The close
interrelationship between "governmenf" and "business" makes it in-
evitable that the policies and actions of each depend upon and tre-
mendously affect those of the other.
In addition to the direct control exercised by the federal, state, and
local governments over public and private industry, the power to tax
and the power to spend are being used to an increasing extent to sup-
plement the more direct forms of regulation. In many types of situa-
tions the taxing power is a peculiarly effective method of effectuating
"non-fiscal" policies.1 For many years it has been recognized that the
*Assistant Professor of Economics and Law, Washington and Lee University.
1 See Shoup, Facing the Tax Problem (1937) 129 et seq.
"Taxation for non-fiscal purposes is taxation not to produce revenue to carry
on a given program of public expenditures but to produce directly certain eco-
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collection of any tax necessarily affects social and economic institutions.
2
Even when laid solely for the purpose of raising revenue, a tax may in-
fluence the buying habits of the public and consequently change the
nature and location of industry; it may have a direct effect upon sav-
ings and upon the accumulation and distribution of wealth. In short,
the government cannot collect revenue without "inevitably affecting
social relations." It is because of this inevitable effect that taxation
assumes such great importance as a means of social control. "The only
real issue," it has been said, "is whether this powerful instrument shall
be wielded blindly or whether it shall be intelligently directed toward
the attainment of consciously sought social objectives."
4
Greater recognition is being given to the fact that all govern-
mental activities interact upon one another and unless there is a care-
ful analysis of the purposes to be achieved by 'each there is great
danger that they will nullify rather than support the general policies
of the governing authority.5 The taxing and spending powers are thus
being used with increasing effectiveness in the redistribution of income
and wealth, to subsidize industry through tax exemptions and direct
payments, and to encourage or prohibit certain types of conduct
through special forms of taxation.6 Inheritance taxes, processing taxes
and farmer benefit payments, protective tariffs, special taxes on oleo-
margarine and state bank notes, exemptions from taxation, excess and
undistributed profits taxes, taxes on liquor-these illustrate but a few
ways in which the taxing and spending powers have been used to
regulate the production, distribution, and consumption of goods and
services.
However, in spite of the fact that federal, state, and local taxes
nomic or social effects irrespective of whether revenue is actually raised or not."
Peck, The Use of the Taxing Power for Non-Fiscal Purposes (1936) i85 Annals of
The American Academy of Political and Social Science 57.
2"Taxation ... is the most pervasive and privileged exercise of the police power;
with the enormous increase in taxes resulting from the war, along with its large
effect on the margins for profit, it is becoming the most effective exercise of the
police power. Even when not consciously intended to be regulative, taxes neverthe-
less regulate." Commons, Instrumental Economics (1934) 820.
'Seligman, Essays in Taxation (1oth ed., 1925) 316; Preliminary Report of the
Committee of the National Tax Association on Federal Taxation of Corporations
(1938) 23, 24.
'Heer. Taxation as an Instrument of Social Control (1937) 42 AM. J. of So-
ciology 484.
'Shoup, op. cit. supra, note i at 129.
OSee Bingham, Economic Effects of the New Deal Tax Policy (1937) 3 So. Econ.
J. 270, 275, 276.
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absorb more than one-fifth of the national income7 the wisdom of us-
ing the taxing power for non-fiscal purposes is still a subject of serious
controversy. 8Although there has been no disagreement concerning the
proposition that the collection of any tax necessarily affects business,
there has been a sharp difference of opinion as to the proper method of
treating this inevitable consequence of taxation. Many believe that the
effect of taxation should be minimized as much as possible-that the
principle of "neutrality" should be a fundamental tenet of public fin-
ance; if there must be social control, the control should be achieved by
direct legislation enacted for that particular purpose. They emphasize
the difficulty of constructing an equitable tax system under the most
favorable circumstances and insist that, because of the scope and com-
plexity of the revenue problem, any attempt to incorporate regulatory
provisions into tax legislation makes it virtually impossible to secure
a satisfactory answer to two questions which are said to be separate and
distinct. The result of this failure to segregate taxation from regulation,
it is argued, is inadequate revenue, ineffective control, or both.
This over-simplification of the problem, however, fails to take into
consideration the fact that since all taxes affect the production, ex-
change, and consumption of goods and services, any attempt to "neu-
tralize" this phenomenon is itself a method of social control. An insist-
ence upon the maintenance of the status quo requires a careful con-
sideration of the effects of taxation and involves exactly the same type-
of "non-fiscal" judgment that is required when a tax is imposed for
the purpose of raising revenue in a manner which will also lead to-
changed conditions of a kind thought desirable by the taxing author-
ity. If the "leave-them-as-you-find-them" 9 principle of taxation does not
involve the exercise of control, then its proponents are reduced to the-
absurd position of advocating the collection of a tax regardless of its.
effect. This, of course, is never done. Whether "consciously, uncon-
sciously, blindly, ignorantly, by greed and camouflage, by demagogic
plutocracy or demagogic democracy,"' 0 the effect of a tax plays an im-
portant part in the legislative process. It is much better to accept the-
7See Moulton and others, Capital, Expense, Employment, and Economic Stability
(1940) 271-
"For example, see Lutz, Public Finance (1936) 371 et seq.; Tuller, The Taxing
Power (1937) 13 et seq.; Todd, Taxation and the Redistribution of Wealth (1937) 22
Bulletin of the National Tax Association 269. Cf. Johnson, Vested Interests in Gov-
ernment Spending (1938) 17 Proceedings Academy of Political Science 7& , 7-
9Buehler, Public Finance (2d ed., 194o) 658.
"Commons, Instrumental Economics (1934) 821.
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fact that legislators do consider expected effects and openly and in-
telligently to adapt them so that they will implement the policies of
the government, than to permit a secret opposition to a changing
-order impair the very real value of an important instrument of control
under the guise of economic doctrine.
Whatever may be the merits of the opposition to the use of taxa-
tion as a means of regulation, it is clear that so far as the income tax
is concerned, taxation is being used for non-fiscal purposes. Although
the need for revenue played an important part in the enactment of in-
,come tax legislation, the post-Civil War acts grew out of the Populist
movement.1' The unrest and demand for social reform during the
latter part of the nineteenth century contributed largely to the enact-
ment of the tax declared unconstitutional in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan
& Trust Co.12 While the bitter denunciation of the Court which follow-
,ed this decision gradually subsided,'3 the movement for tax reform
-continued and resulted in the Corporation Franchise Act of 19o914 and
and the Sixteenth Amendment..
While the policy underlying the use of the graduated income tax
has long been the subject of dispute,15 it is clear that regardless of
whether its justification is found in the fact that it is the best measure
of the taxpayer's "ability to pay" or that it is the most efficient means
of "redistributing" income, the deduction provisions of the present
federal statute are a necessary part of the successful operation of either
policy. Since the taxpayer's gross income16 is brought within the scope
,of the statute and since two persons with the same gross income may
have entirely different net incomes, neither the "ability" theory nor
ithe "redistribution" theory will be followed unless the deduction sec-
tion permits an accurate reflection of the prevailing concept of income.
In addition to the major function of determining income, the de-
,duction section has been used for the purpose of effectuating other
"See Blakey, the Federal Income Tax (1940) Ch. i.
"157 U. S. 429, 15 S. Ct. 673 (1895); 158 U. S. 6oi, 15 S. Ct. 912 (1895). See
Buehler, Regulatory Taxation (1939) 17 Harv. Bus. Rev. 138.
"For a reprint of editorials see Department of Justice, Taxation of Government
Bondholders and Employees (1938) Appendix Vol. i, No. 1o.
U36 Stat. 11, 112.
"With Seligman, Progressive Taxation in Theory and Practice (1894), Part II,
,compare Simons, Personal Income Taxation (1938) 18 et seq.; Messages of President
Roosevelt of June ig, 1935, March 3, 1936 and November 16, 1937; Hale, Economic
Theory and the Statesman, in Tugwell, the Trend of Economics (1924) 189, 217
,et seq.
"See Internal Revenue Code of 1939 § 22.
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policies of the national government. The most obvious example is, of
course, the deduction for charitable contributions.17 Largely in an
effort to encourage private charitable institutions which perform a
part of the activities of government, Congress has provided for a
limited reduction in taxes for those who donate to such institutions.' 8
However, the deduction is not limited to charities. Contributions to
federal, state, and local governments, and to war veteran and fraternal
organizations are also encouraged. In an effort to "stimulate prospect-
ing and exploration"'19 special deduction provisions have been includedh
in various revenue measures. 20 Deductions based on "discovery value"
rather than cost and percentage depletion based on gross income have-
been used to encourage the development of the mining and oil and.
gas industries. Although the deduction of interest on indebtedness in-
curred to purchase or carry tax exempt securities is not permitted, an
exception is made in the case of original subscribers who purchase-
United States obligations.21 Since banks and other financial institu-
tions pay interest on much of their funds used for investment, this ex--
ception was made in order to protect the market for federal bonds. 22 "
Finally, the deduction of travelling expense while away from home-
incurred in the pursuit of a trade or business, "including the entire-
amount expended for meals and lodging" 23 and the deduction of pay--
ments made to irrevocable employees' pension trusts24 were includedl
for the respective purposes of encouraging persons to enter business for-
themselves (1) 25 and to prevent employees from being deprived of
expected benefits which would result from a termination of revocable
trusts. 26 Thus Congress has intentionally employed income tax deduc-
tions. as a means of securing desired courses of conduct and in a very
real sense much of this effort has been successful.27
1"lnternal Revenue Code of 1939 § 23 (o), (q).
'BE. g., see Committee Reports to this effect reprinted in 1939-1 (Part 2) C. B_
741, 742, 789, 795.
"1939-i (Part 2) C. B. 121.
1'For the modified provisions see Internal Revenue Code of 1939 §§ 2a (M), 114.
(b), (2), (s), (4)-
'1 lnternal Revenue Code of 1939 § 23 (b).
22939-1 (Part 2) C. B. 604.
=Internal Revenue Code of 1939 § 23 (a) (I).
"Internal Revenue Code of 1939 § 23 (p).
261 Cong. Rec. 5201.
"1939-1 (Part a) C. B. 761.
2'For a discussion of the extent to which the combined income tax and estate
tax deductions encourage gifts to charity see Harriss, Taxes and Philanthropy
(1940) 32 Columbia Univ. Q. 112. See also Magill, Federal Regulation of Family
1941]
196 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. II
However, as is usually the case with taxation, income tax deductions
have produced consequences of both a favorable and unfavorable na-
-ture. For example, the deduction for interest is allowed even though
-not incurred in the production of income.28 Since the rental value of
his residence is not taxed to the home-owner, this deduction, coupled
-with a similar one for taxes, 29 encourages home ownership. In view of
the exemption of building and loan associations from taxationa0 this
result appears to be consistent with congressional policy. But since the
,deduction is also allowed to corporations and since there is a policy to
;tax corporate income both to the corporation and later to the taxpayer
when received in the form of dividends, the interest deduction offers an
-opportunity to avoid the tax to the corporation; by issuing bonds in-
.stead of stock to its shareholders, it is thus possible for many corpora-
tions greatly to reduce their taxable profit by the simple expedient of
paying dividends in the form of interest.81
Because of the deliberate use which Congress has made of income
tax deductions in the past and because of the inevitable effect such de-
ductions have on corporate policies and individual conduct,8 2 it is to
be expected that this practice will become of increasing importance
in the future. By adjusting deductions particularly important to select-
ed types of income, by classifying and giving varying effect to certain
expenditures, by'providing for new and eliminating old deductions, it
is possible to penalize or subsidize industries, occupations and trades,
and to regulate through coercion and reward.3 3 Unless the Constitu-
tion stands in the way, an absolute control over deductions offers an-
other powerful weapon of social control.
Settlements (1937) 4 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 265, 278. See also Harriss, Philanthropy and
Federal Tax Exemptions (1939) 47 J. Pol. Econ. 526, 541.
'Internal Revenue Code of 1939 § 23 (b).
'Id. § 23 (c).
3MId. § 1oi (4).
"Conrad, Some Suggestions for Changes in the Federal Income Tax (1939) 17
Taxes 713, 717, 718; Magill, Effects of Taxation on Corporate Policies (1938) 72
U. S. L. Rev. 637, 644.
'Lay, Some Public and Business Policies Embodied in the Federal Income Tax
(1938) 18 Southwestern Soc. Sci. Q. 322.
3"The whole theory of 'incentive taxation' can by a simple twist of the tongue
be transformed into 'penalty taxation,' if one wills to do so. The taxpayer who is
allowed to deduct from his taxable income the amount of his charitable contribu-
tions during the year is favored over the taxpayer who, having made no such con-
-tributions, is 'penalized' for his failure to do so. The matter is one of draftsmanship.
Since the two forms of statutes do not have different effects, it is submitted that
they should not have different constitutional consequences." Gellhorn, Administra-
.tive Law (1940) 444, 445-
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The Supreme Court of the United States has repeatedly expressed
the view that federal income tax deductions are exclusively a matter of
legislative concern; that they involve statutory and not constitutional
problems.34 Typical of the many statements found in the Board of Tax
Appeals, lower federal court, and Supreme Court opinions is the one
appearing in Helvering v. Independent Life Insurance Company: "Un-
questionably Congress has power to condition, limit, or deny deduc-
tions from gross income in order to arrive at the net that it chooses to
tax."8
5
While the cases fully support the statement that Congress has the
power to deny all deductions from gross income,3 6 there is considerable
doubt as to the power of Congress to condition such deductions. Taken
literally it would, of course, give the national government tremendous
power over matters heretofore considered to be exclusively within the
control of the states. Because of the steeply graduated personal income
tax rates3 7 and because of the magnitude of corporate deductions when
compared with net income,38 the economic coercion resulting from a
threat of disallowance would compel prompt compliance with many
forms of regulation.
However, the broad generalizations of the type quoted above ap-
pear in cases dealing with interpretations of the Fifth and Sixteenth
Amendments. The questions under discussion related solely to the
constitutional rights of private persons and did not involve alleged en-
croachments by the national government upon the reserved powers of
the states. Actually, the Supreme Court has not permitted Congress to
exercise uncontrolled discretion over deductions. In 1921, Congress re-
vised the income tax sections relating to life insurance companies for
the purpose of providing a more equitable method of taxing their
3'See White v. United States, 3o5 U. S. 281, 292, 59 S. Ct. 179, 184 (1938); Deputy
v. DuPont, 3o8 U. S. 488, 6o S. Ct. 363, 366 (1940); and Helvering v. Winmill, 3o 5
U. S. 79, 84, 59 S. Ct. 45, 47 (1938).
'292 U. S. 37t, 381, 54 S. Ct. 758, 76o (1934).
"More than a hundred cases have been found which support those cited in note
34 supra.
3TThe refusal of a deduction to a taxpayer in the highest income bracket would
result in an increase in the surtax of 75 per-cent of the deduction disallowed. See
Internal Revenue Code of 1939, § 12.
"Aggregate federal eorporate tax returns for 1936 reported total receipts of
$132,722,6o2,ooo. Total deductions amounted to $124,951,715,ooo. Although $78,023,-
o7,ooo of this latter sum represented cost of goods sold, nevertheless even the bal-
ance amounted to almost six times the net corporate income. U. S. Treasury Depart-
ment, Statistics of Income for 1936, Patt 2, p. 24.
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earnings. Of the various deductions permitted there was one for tax ex-
empt interest and another for 4% of certain reserves less the
amount of the aforementioned interest which had been previously
deducted. 9 In National Life Insurance Co. v. United States40 the Su-
preme Court declared the act unconstitutional. "Congress had no
power purposely and directly to tax state obligations by refusing to
their owners deductions allowed to others."
41
In view of these conflicting statements, the extent to which Congress
may use deductions from gross income as a means of attaining objdc-
tives which could not be reached by direct action is by no means dear.
As Congress has made no attempt to use the deduction section to secure
such objectives since the decision in National Life Insurance Co. v.
United States, there are no additional Supreme Court cases directly in
point. However, a number of important cases growing out of similar
federal tax legislation and a rapidly changing political and economic
panorama suggest a probable solution to the problem.
The growing importance of government in business, the immediate
sensitiveness of a competitive economy to a relative change in prices and
purchasing power, the impossibility of insulating the effects of direct
regulation, taxation, and public expenditures-all obviously require
coordinated and cooperative action on the part of private enterprise
and the national, state, and local governments. Seriously divergent
policies must inevitably result in chaos. In a sense it is thus unfortunate
that the uncertainty as to the nature and extent of the powers of Con-
gress and of the several state legislatures has often led to an artificial
selection of the instruments of social control. Instead of selecting the
most effective means of reaching a desired result it has often been neces-
sary to select a cumbersome and even an unsatisfactory method of at-
taining a legislative objective.
Since the power of Congress to "lay and collect taxes, duties, im-
posts and excises" 42 is said to embrace "every conceivable power of
taxation, '4 and since taxation inevitably affects economic and social
relations, it is not surprising that this fortuitous conjunction of politic-
al and economic power should be exercised with increasing frequency.
s9Revenue Act of 1921, § 245.
4*277 U. S. 508, 48 S. Ct. 591 (1928).
41277 U. S. 508, 522, 48 S. Ct. 591, 594. Cf. Revenue Act of 1928, § 117.
"U. S. Const. Art I, § 8. "The Congress shall have the power to lay and collect
taxes, duties, imposts and excises."
"Brushaber v. Union Pacific R. Co., 240 U. S. 1, 12, 36 S. Ct. 236, 239 (1916).
INCOME TAX DEDUCTIONS
Aside from its superior effectiveness for many purposes, it has the ob-
vious advantage of constitutional validity in many types of situations, 44
a validity which makes its use advisable from a political point of view
even though the exercise of some other, but less extensive, grant of
authority would be more advantageous from an economic standpoint.
Thus constitutional considerations compel congressional use and mis-
use of the taxing power. Constitutional considerations likewise form
the basis of attack upon the exercise of this power. Undoubtedly a large
part of the opposition to the use of the national taxing power for non-
fiscal purposes is based upon either an objection to an extension of the
activities of Congress in general or an objection to specific regulations
in particular rather than because of any fundamental disapproval of
regulation by taxation. By insisting upon a different and, allegedly,
more direct method of social control, it has been frequently possible to
raise serious constitutional doubts as to its validity and thus discourage
its enactment, or, if this fails, to argue that the legislation is not in sub-
stance a tax even though it is in form. Since every tax statute represents
at least an ostensible attempt to raise revenue and necessarily operates
as a method of control,45 the Supreme Court has frequently been
called upon to determine the permissible limits of this inherent power-
to-regulate-through-taxation. Unless it is to be supposed that the tax-
ing power of Congress is the Achilles heel of our dual system of govern-
ment, some line must be drawn between permissible revenue measures
and unconstitutional interference. 46 Yet the drawing of this line is ex-
tremely difficult. Running counter to the concept of states' rights is the
powerful force of economic necessity. The development of transporta-
tion and communication has obliterated state boundaries for many
practical purposes. 47 It has long been recognized that in many situa-
tions regulation must be nation-wide if it is to be effective. The internal
affairs of the states are becoming increasingly subject to federal control.
"See Hall, Government and Business (1939) 311-314.
""In the levying of every tax Congress must inevitably have a purpose other
than the raising of revenue since it cannot escape the responsibility of controlling
in the national interest the non-fiscal regulatory effects of the distribution of tax
burdens. There can, in short, be no such thing as taxation for revenue only." Cush-
man, Social and Economic Control through Taxation (1934) 17 Minn. L. Rev. 757,
764.
""Congress is not empowered to tax for those purposes which are within the
exclusive province of the states." Marshall, C. J., in Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. x,
gg (U. S. 1824). See also, Powell, Child Labor, Congress, and the Constitution
(1922) 1 N. C. L. Rev. 61, 69; Rottschaefer, Constitutional Law (1939) 175 et seq.
'7E. g., the Shreveport case, Houston, E. & W. Texas Ry. Co. v. United States,
234 U. S. 342, 34 S. Ct. 833 (1914).
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In addition to the current trend toward greater centralization,
those who oppose the use of the taxing power for non-fiscal purposes
have been faced with a long-continued course of legislative conduct to
the contrary, conduct which has been sustained, moreover, by numer-
our Supreme Court decisions.
The framers of the Constitution were well aware of the regulatory
aspects of taxationA8 Colonial tariffs and the interstate barriers under
the Articles of Confederation supplied ample training in the use of
tax legislation for non-fiscal purposes.49 This recognition was voiced
from the floor of the Convention and is contained in the Constitution
itself.50 The requirement that direct taxes be apportioned is a lasting
memorial to a keen appreciation of the possible effect of a national
capitation tax upon the existence of slavery in the South.51
The second act of the new Congress, 2 a tariff on imports "for the
support of government... and the encouragement and protection of
manufactures," eloquently describes the prevailing legislative opinion
in 1789. Furthermore, this use of the taxing power to secure collateral
results was not confined to import duties. In 1791 a tax was laid on
domestic liquor;53 although enacted primarily for the purpose of rais-
ing revenue, one of the reasons given for this particular exaction was
that it would tend to discourage the consumption of alcoholic bever-
ages. Thus, the virtually contemporaneous action of members of Con-
"Brant, Regulation by Taxation (19s5) 85 New Republic 98. Cf. Cushman,
The National Police Power under the Taxing Clause of the Constitution (1920) 4
Minn. L. Rev. 247, 296 n. 34; Stocking, The Development of American Institutions, in
Spahr and Others, Economic Principles and Problems (1940) 41, 49.
"For numerous illustrations see Opinion of the Justices, 196 Mass. 6o3, 85 N. E.
545, 908).
'For example, see Madison, Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787
(1920) 412.
"Paterson, J., a member of the Consitution Convention, said that "The pro-
vision was made in favor of the southern states. They possessed a large number of
slaves; and had extensive tracts of territory, thinly settled, and not very productive.
A majority of the states had but few slaves, and several of them a limited territory,
well settled, and in a high state of cultivation. The southern states, if no provision
had been introduced into the Constitution, would have been wholly at the mercy of
the other states. Congress, in such case, might tax slaves, at discretion or arbitrarily,
and land in every part of the Union at the same rate or measure: so much a head in
the first instance, and so much an acre in the second. To guard them against im-
position in these particulars, was the reason of introducing the clause in the Con-
stitution, which directs that representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned
among the states, according to their respective numbers." Hylton v. United States,
3 Dall. 171, 177 (U. S. 1796).
01 Stat. 24 (1789)-
1 Stat. 199 (179 0 .
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gress, many of whom were members of the Constitutional Convention,
indicates that the latter body saw no objection to taxation for regula-
tory purposes54-at least so long as the statute was in the form of a rev-
enue measure habitually employed for fiscal purpose. Congress was
deliberately given very broad taxing powers; there was no intention to
perpetuate the fundamental weaknesses of the Confederation. These
powers were known to have regulatory consequences, yet there was no
attempt to confine such consequences within the limits of the other
delegated powers.
In view of the scope of the federal taxing power and the historical
basis. 5 for its use for non-fiscal purposes, it was to be expected that at-
tempts to use it to burden and to prohibit would be sustained by the
Supreme Court. And such has been the case. As long as the statute has
been in the form of an ordinary revenue measure it has been invariably
upheld. There has been no constitutional objection to a tax which
"merely" handicaps or discourages a given course of conduct. Thus in
Veazie Bank v. Fenno56 the "tax" on state bank notes was sustained
even though it was dear that the statute would not produce revenue.
Although the Court did mention the fact that Congress had the power
to regulate currency, the decision was based squarely upon the proposi-
tion that Congress had the power to tax such notes and having this
power, the Court would not inquire into the amount of the tax or the
purpose for which it was enacted.
The doctrine of the Veazie Bank case was reaffirmed in McCray v.
United States.57 Although it was argued that the federal tax on colored
oleomargarine was so high that it would destroy the industry, the Court
refused to inquire into the reason for its enactment. There being a
power to tax, the rate was not a matter of judicial concern. Further-
more, even if there had been an abuse of power by Congress, the
Court would not abuse its own power by disciplining another branch
of the national government. 58 Other but less extreme cases indicated
the same judicial attitude. An inheritance tax was sustained in Knowl-
"'See J. w. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U. S. 394, 412, 48 S. Ct. 348,
353 (1928).
1z"Since 1789 the Federal Government has used the taxing power to encourage
or discourage, or even destroy, certain businesses, regulate others, and prevent still
others from entering the field." Anderson, Taxation, Recovery, and Defense (1940)
68.
.8 Wall. 533 (U. S. 1869).
37195 U. S. 27, 24 S. Ct. 769 (1904).
W195 U. S. 27 at 54, 24 S. Ct. 769 at 776 (19o4).
1941]
202 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. II
ton v. Moore59 and a tax on foreign-built yachts in Billings v. United
States;60 the former tax received strong congressional support because
it was admittedly a method of reducing large family fortunes while the
latter tax was enacted as a measure to protect domestic ship-building.
An attempt to regulate corporations6' and at the same time to avoid, in
part, the decision in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. 02 was suc-
cessful when the Corporation Excise Tax Act of 1909 was upheld in
Flint v. Stone-Tracy Co.63 The objection that a tax on corporations
chartered by the states would enable Congress to destroy such institu-
tions was said not to be a matter for the Court to decide. "The remedy
for such wrongs, if such in fact exist, is in the ability of the people to
choose their own representatives, and not in the exertion of unwar-
ranted powers by courts of justice."64
In addition to sustaining prohibitive sanctions in the bare form of
tax legislation, the Supreme Court for a number of years indicated a
willingness to sustain regulations which were incorporated in the
statute for the ostensible purpose of aiding in the collection of the tax.
In Nicol v. Ames65 a federal "statute of frauds" for boards of trade was
sustained as a legitimate part of a tax statute. While the act prescribed
in detail the information to be contained in the memorandum of sale,
it was justified on the ground that the provisions were simply "means of
identifying the sale, and for collecting the tax by means of the required
stamp." Again, in Felsenheld v. United States," the Court upheld a
section of the statute laying an excise tax on tobacco which prohibited
the inclusion of "any article or thing whatsoever" on, in, or with the
package containing the tobacco other than specified stamps and labels;
even though the coupon in question was of inappreciable weight and
in no way interfered with the collection of the tax, Congress could
provide that the package bearing the revenue stamps "shall contain
only the article which is subject to the tax."
A much more ambitious scheme to use the ancillary powers of taxa-
tion was sustained in United States v. Doremus.67 In declaring the Har-
ED178 U. S. 41, 20 S. Ct. 747 (1900).
6'232 U. S. 261, 34 S. Ct. 421 (1914).
""The first and only step thus far taken to place corporations, aside from rail-
roads, under some form of government control." Bruce, Taxation of Manufactur-
ing and Mercantile Corporations (1910) 3 State and Local Taxation 304.
"157 U. S. 429, 15 S. Ct. 673 (1895); 158 U. S. 6oi, 15 S. Ct. 912 (1895).
"220 U. S. 107, 31 S. Ct. 342 (1911).
9"220 U. S. 107, 169, 31 S. Ct. 342, 366 (1911).
"173 U. S. 509, 19 S. Ct. 522 (1899).
"s86 U. S. 126, 22 S. Ct. 740 (1902).
67249 U. S. 86, 39 S. Ct. 214 (1919).
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rison Narcotic Drug Act constitutional, the Court said that Congress
was clearly authorized to select as a subject of taxation dispensers of
narcotics; since the detailed provisions relating to their registration
had the tendency to diminish the clandestine sale of narcotics without
paying the tax,68 "the legislation enacted has some reasonable relation
to the exercise of the taxing authority conferred by the Constitution,




Thus, for the first one hundred and thirty years under the Constitu-
tion, the Court refused to make a distinction between taxes for fiscal
and for non-fiscal purposes. Although federal taxes had been declared
unconstitutional because they were said to violate the requirement of
apportionment, 70 or were on exports,71 or were contrary to the doctrine
of intergovernmental tax immunity,72 no tax statute had been held in-
valid because of its regulatory effect. The national government had a
broad taxing power, and in the exercise of this power its discretion as
to the amount to be exacted was not subject to judicial review. Tax-
ation often acted as a deterrent and occasionally as a prohibition; the
motive for such action was immaterial. The selection of the object of
the tax always involved non-fiscal considerations.73 Consequently when
President Taft, in order to eradicate an occupational disease resulting
from the handling of white phosphorus, recommended,7 4 and Congress
6"The tax was "$i. per annum."
"249 U. S. 86, 93, 39 S. Ct. 214, 216 (1919).
'Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U. S. 429, 15 S. Ct. 673 (1895);
Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. S. 189, 40 S. Ct. 189 (1920).
"Fairbank v. United States, 181 U. S. 283, 21 S. Ct. 648 (19o); United States v.
Hvoslef, 237 U. S. 1, 35 S. Ct. 459 (1915); Thames & Mersey Marine Ins. Co. v. United
States, 237 U. S. 19, 35 S. Ct. 496 (s915).
='Collector v. Day, ii Wall. 113 (U. S. 1871); United States v. Railroad Co., 17
Wall. 322 (U. S. 1873).
-'"It is a common but, as we think, erroneous opinion in some quarters that the
legislative body enacting a taxing statute cannot with propriety take into considera-
tion any other matters but the revenue sought to be obtained, and that if it has other
purposes besides raising revenue in imposing the tax, or in prescribing a particular
manner in which it shall be levied, the tax is invalid. When enacting a statute, it is
not only the right but the duty of a legislative body in such cases to take into con-
sideration the effect of the tax in an economic way on the people as a whole, and
the beneficial or injurious effects as the case may be which will result from the man-
ner in which the tax is levied. If this were not done, the result might be highly in-
jurious to the public generally, and result in a condition of affairs which would
arouse so much protest and objection that our institutions would be endangered."
Green, J., in F. Couthoui, Inc. v. United States, 54 F. (2d) 158, 162, 163 (Ct. Cl., 1931).
'Message of December 6, 191o.
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enacted,75 a prohibitive tax on the manufacture of white phosphorus
matches, the constitutional power of the national government was not
seriously questioned.
76
Because of the unbroken line of authority sustaining the taxing
power it was only reasonable that, when an attempt to regulate child
labor through the exercise of its power over commerce failed in Ham-
mer v. Dagenhart,77 Congress should immediately thereafter seek to
reach the same result through taxation. However, in Bailey v. Drexel
Furniture Co.78 the Court refused to follow its earlier practice and de-
clared invalid the tax on the net profits of a business knowingly em-
ploying child labor. While indicating a willingness to concede that the
question of intent would not be considered when dealing with a pro-
hibitory excise on "a commodity or other thing of value," Mr. Chief
Justice Taft, speaking for the majority, insisted that a detailed course
of conduct prescribed by the act presented a different problem; it was
an attempt to regulate subjects not entrusted to Congress. Although the
Court said that the provisions appearing on the face of the statute were
not "naturally and reasonably adapted to the collection of the tax,"79
and thus sought to distinguish it from the narcotics tax, it should be
noted that the detailed specifications in the child labor statute, unlike
those of the earlier legislation, were not enacted as an ostensible aid to
collection. Instead, they were merely descriptive of the industries sub-
ject to the tax-just as "notes used for circulation," "oleomargarine
which is yellow in color," and "white phosphorus matches" described,
in part, the businesses subject to other federal excise taxes. It is diffi-
cult to see how an excise tax on a business employing child labor dis-
closes a clearer intention to regulate matters within the control of
the states than does an excise on matches containing white phosphorus;
yet to Taft the President and Taft the Chief Justice (in both offices
under oath to support the Constitution of the United States) the two
were entirely different. If the classification was valid under the Fifth
Amendment, the Tenth Amendment should not have stood in the
way. As was illustrated by the state bank note, olemargarine, narcotics,
inheritance, and corporation tax cases, the power to tax necessarily car-
ried with it the power to interfere with local affairs. Yet in Hill v. Wal-
"'37 Stat. 8 (1912).
"The Act was not litigated. Shoup, Facing the Tax Problem (1937) 192.
'247 U. S. 251, 38 S. Ct. 529 (1918).
7"259 U. S. 20, 42 S. Ct. 449 (1922).
'259 U. S. 20, 43, 42 S. Ct. 449, 453 (1922).
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lace,s0 decided the same day, the Court again held a business tax in-
valid. A "tax" on the sale of grain at boards of trade other than those
boards of trade which complied with the requirements of the statute
was also said to be an attempt to regulate rather than to tax.
Beginning with the Child Labor Tax Case, the Court for more
than a decade thereafter displayed a vacillating attitude with regard
to the power of Congress to tax for non-fiscal purposes. For example,
it refused to grant certiorari in two cases8' where lower federal courts
sustained the federal tax on the sale of tickets away from the box office.
Although the rate was so graduated that "the ticket speculator has no
motive to sell for a premium of between 50 cents and $1,"82 the lower
courts did not consider this a direct interference with state activity.
Perhaps the fact that the Supreme Court had previously held that the
states themselves could not regulate the price of theatre tickets83 justi-
fied the belief that this was not an "unauthorized exercise by Congress
of police power."8 4 Any doubt as to the availability of the taxing power
for regulatory measures was put to rest by the Supreme Court in J. W.
Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States.8 5 "So long as the motive of Con-
gress and the effects of its legislative action are to secure revenue for
the benefit of the general government, the existence of other motives
in the selection of the subjects of taxes cannot invalidate congressional
action."8 6 Yet in spite of this the Court in United States v. Constan-
tine8 7 declared invalid a special excise tax on persons carrying on a
liquor business in violation of state law. Since the exaction in question
was in addition to the regular tax, since it was highly exorbitant, and
since the condition of its imposition was the commission of a crime, the
9'259 U. S. 44, 42 S. Ct. 453 (1922). See also Trusler v. Crooks, 269 U. S. 475, 46
S. Ct. 165 (1926).8sMcKenna v. Anderson, 31 F. (2d) ioi6 (C. C. A. 2d, 1929), cert. denied, 279
U. S. 869,49 S. Ct. 482 (1929); Couthoui v. United States, 54 F. (2d) 158 (Ct. Ci., 1931)
cert. denied, 285 U. S. 548, 52 S. Ct. 396 (1932). Accord: Alexander Theatre Ticket
Office, Inc. v. United States, 23 F. (2d) 44 (C. C. A. 2d, 1927); Apollo Operating Corp.
v. Anderson, 55 F. (2d) 66 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932).
'2Alexander Theatre Ticket Office, Inc. v. United States, 23 F. (2d) 44, 48 (C. C.
A. 2d, 1927).
wrTyson & Bro. United Theatre Ticket Offices v. Banton, 273 U. S. 418, 47 S. Ct.
426 (1927).
8'23 F. (2d) 44, 47 (C. C. A. 2d, 1927).
6276 U. S. 394, 48 S. Ct. 348 (1928). Tariff Act of 1922, § 315, authorizing the
President to regulate customs duties in order to equalize the costs of production in
the United States and competing foreign countries held valid.
U2 7 6 U. S. 394, 412, 48 S. Ct. 348, 353 (1928).
8296 U. S. 287, 56 S. Ct. 223 (1935).
1941]
206 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. II
Court declared it to be a penalty, and being a penalty, it was an at-
tempt to "usurp the police powers of the state." Mr. Justice Cardozo in
his dissenting opinion pointed out, however, that the classification ivas
a reasonable one, that the large profits of an illegal business, the ex-
pense and difficulty of tax collection, and the propriety of a higher tax
on illegality all led to the conclusion that the statute was an appropri-
ate means of raising revenue.
In United States v. Butler88 the A. A. A. processing tax was held in-
valid since it was part of a scheme to regulate farm production. Since
the statute under consideration contained detailed regulatory provis-
ions relating neither to the description of the persons subject to the
tax nor to the means of collecting it, it represented a departure from
the earlier tax legislation. It was largely because of this departure that
the act was declared unconstitutional. If the expenditure section of
the statute had been carefully insulated from the tax section, under
prior decisions8 9 the taxpayer would have been in no position to ob-
ject to the manner in which the proceeds were used. Standing alone,
the processing tax was clearly a valid exercise of the federal taxing
power. 90 Except as a lesson of doubtful value in the drafting of statutes,
the Butler case has little bearing upon the question of regulatory tax-
ation; and even the uncertainty created by the Constantine case has
been largely dispelled.
The National Firearms Act91 providing for the registration and tax-
ation of dealers, a tax of $200 on each transfer of certain types of fire-
arms, and for the identification of transferees was sustained in Sonzinsky
v. United States.92 Even though it was argued that the statute was en-
acted for the purpose of regulating and suppressing traffic in firearms,
the Court refused to limit the federal taxing power. It said:
"Every tax is in some measure regulatory. To some extent it
interposes an economic impediment to the activity taxed....
But a tax is not any the less a tax because it has a regulatory
effect .... and it has long been established that an Act of Con-
gress which on its face purports to be an exercise of the taxing
power is not any the less so because the tax is burdensome or
tends to restrict or suppress the thing taxed .... Inquiry into the
'8297 U. S. 1, 56 S. Ct. 312 (1936). Also Rickert Rice Mills v. Fortenot, 297 U. S.
110, 56 S. Ct. 374 (1936).
'*Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447, 43 S. Ct. 597 (1923).
mCincinnati Soap Co. v. United States, 3oi U. S. 308, 57 S. Ct. 764 (1936).
"148 Stat. 1236 (1934).
'300 U. S. 506, 57 S. Ct. 554 (1937).
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hidden motives which may move Congress to exercise a power
constitutionally conferred upon it is beyond the competency of
courts."
93
Thus the Court reaffirmed the traditional view that a statute appear-
ing on its face to be a revenue measure will be treated as an exercise of
the taxing power. The fact that Congress intends to achieve some re-
sult in addition to an avowed purpose of seeking funds for public ex-
penditure will not defeat the legislation; "objective constitutionality"
94
and not "the process of psychoanalysis" 95 determines its validity.
However, if the statute contains detailed regulations which do not
facilitate the collection of revenue a much more serious question is
raised. In Carter v. Carter Coal Co.9 6 a tax of 15% on the sale
price of bituminous coal with a 13V% drawback for those operators
who complied with the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act was de-
clared to be a penalty and not a tax. But in Sunshine Anthracite Coal
Co. v. Adkins97 the 19/2% tax imposed by the Bituminous Coal Act
of 1937 upon non-code members engaged in interstate commerce was
sustained, the regulatory provisions being "clearly within the power of
Congress under the commerce clause of the Constitution."98 Since the
tax question was not seriously argued in the Carter case it is difficult to
evaluate this method of regulation when the federal taxing power alone
is the basis for the local interference. A conditional tax or a condi-
tional drawback may be declared invalid even though a classified tax
which gives something of the same result may be valid. That is, a "tax"
may be used to discourage or prohibit a certain course of conduct even
though it may not be possible to secure affirmative action through a
coercive exaction; situations requiring administrative flexibility may
be beyond federal control even though the static aspect of the same
problem may be effectively regulated.
However, any implied limitations upon the federal taxing power
must be carefully examined. The relatively few cases declaring federal
tax statutes unconstitutional are being carefully reconsidered by the
Supreme Court. The restriction against the taxation of the salaries of
03oo U. S. 506, 513-514, 57 S. Ct. 554, 555, 556 (1937).
'Cushman, Social and Economic Control Through Federal Taxation (1934) 18
Minn. L. Rev. 757, 774 et seq.
"From the opinion of Cardozo, J., dissenting in United States v. Constantine,
296 U. S. 287, 299, 56 S. Ct. 223, 228 (1935).
10298 U. S. 238, 56 S. Ct. 855 (1956).
'31o U. S. 381, 6o S. Ct. 907 (1940).
Ws31o U. S. 381, 393, 60 S. Ct. 907, 912 (1940).
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federal judges has disappeared.9 9 There is increasing reluctance to
strike down retroactive taxes' 00 and there is a tendency to narrow the
direct tax concept so that it includes only capitation taxes and assess-
ments upon real property.1°1 The doctrine of intergovernmental tax
immunity is rapidly disappearing,10 2 and it is even possible that the
Court will revert to the view advanced by Chief Justice Marshall in
McCulloch v. Maryland'0 3 that state institutions are protected from
the national taxing power only by the uniformity and apportionment
clauses of the Constitution and by the locally elected members of Con-
gress. In fact, the Court has sustained the use of "economic coercion"
on the states in order to compel them to enact legislation thought de-
sirable by Congress. The 80% credit against the federal estate tax
for amounts paid to state governments under similar statutes was sus-
tained over the objection of the State of Florida.' °4 And in Chas. C.
Steward Machine Co. v. Davis10 5 a federal tax on employers with a
90% credit for contributions made by such employers to state un-
employment funds established in compliance with federal regula-
tions was held valid. Compared with the possible implications of the
Davis and state employee tax case,' 06 the interference with local affairs
objected to in United States v. Constantine appears mild indeed; and
even if the Constantine decision has not been immunized by Sonzinsky
v. United States, 0 7 the strong dissent in the earlier case and the present
attitude of the Court give it very doubtful authority.
The other cases holding federal tax statutes invalid because of their
non-fiscal character are of small solace to opponents of federal regula-
tion. United States v. Butler never amounted to more than a "lesson
in legislative draftsmanship,"'108 and the rapidly expanding power over
commerce has largely nullified the effects of the remaining cases. Four
months after Hill v. Wallace Congress enacted a similar statute which
"See O'Malley v. Woodrough, 307 U. S. 277, 59 S. Ct. 838 (1939). Public Salary
Tax Act of 1939, § 3.
"'E. g., see United States v. Hudson, 299 U. S. 498, 57 S. Ct. 309 (1937).
mSee New York ex rel. Cohn v. Graves, 300 U. S. 308, 57 S. Ct. 466 (1937).
'Graves v. O'Keefe, 306 U. S. 466, 480, 59 S. Ct. 595, 598 (1939).
u34 Wheat. 316, 435, 436 (U. S. 1819).
'"Florida v. Mellon, 273 U. S. 12, 47 S. Ct. 265 (1927).
'03o1 U. S. 548, 57 S. Ct. 883 (1937). See also Helvering v. Davis, 301 U. S. 619,
57 S. Ct. 904 (1937).
"'Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U. S. 405, 58 S. Ct. 969 (1938).
"3oo U. S. 506, 57 S. Ct. 554 (1937).
208Powell, The Processing Tax and the Social Security Act (1936) 5 Brooklyn L.
Rev. 125, 130.
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was sustained in Chicago Board of Trade v. Olsen.109 The regulation
of the bituminous coal industry which was declared invalid in Carter
v. Carter Coal Co. was redrafted and upheld in Sunshine Anthracite
Coal Co. v. Adkins. Even Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co. has been ef-
fectively circumscribed by the implications of National Labor Rela-
tions Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporaton,11 0 by the specific
provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938,111 and by United
States v. F. W. Darby Lumber Co.
1 1 2
The refurbishing of the taxing power, the broadening of the con-
cept of interstate commerce and of the doctrine which permits national
regulation of matters which "directly affect" such commerce, the con-
trol over foreign trade and banking and currency, the exclusive man-
agement of the postal service, and the power to enact bankruptcy
measures-all combine to give tremendous power to the national gov-
ernment. In view of the multiple powers which may be exercised by
Congress and the unsympathetic manner in which the Supreme Court
has recently cited those tax decisions which overrode important nation-
al legislation, it may be reasonably supposed that future attempts to
use the taxing power either as an independent source of authority for
regulation or as an aid to some other delegated power will meet with
little constitutional restraint.
2'262 U. S. 1, 43 S. Ct. 470 (1923).
11301 U. S. 1, 57 S. Ct. 615 (1937).
152 Stat. io6o (1938) §§ i (1), 12.
n261 S. Ct. 451 (1941), overruling Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251, 39 S. Ct.
529 (1918).
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